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Recent Decision
SECURITIES REGULATION -ATTORNEYS' LIABILITY-
NEGLIGENCE STANDARD INVOKED TO MEASURE CULPABILITY OF
WRITER OF OPINION LETTER-SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.'
Appellee attorney, Stuart Schiffman, prepared an opinion
letter which stated that a substantial quantity of unregistered
securities involved in a fraudulent securities scheme were exempt
from registration requirements. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), alleging that the letter was the basis on
which some of the unregistered stock was sold, charged Schiffman
and others involved in the scheme with violations of the registra-
tion' and antifraud 3 provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (the
1933 Act) and the antifraud provision4 of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act).
Although the SEC obtained permanent injunctions against
ten of the defendants,5 it was unsuccessful in its efforts in the
district court to obtain a preliminary injunction against Schiff-
man. The district court, finding no material factual dispute in the
affidavits and depositions warranting an evidentiary hearing,
made three conclusions: that there was no evidence of use of
Schiffman's letter in a "sale";' that there had "been no showing
that. . .Schiffman is likely to run afoul of the law in the future";7
and lastly, that there was insufficient evidence that Schiffman
had violated any securities law. Concerning the third conclusion,
the district court stated that there was no authority for the classi-
fication of an opinion writer as an "underwriter" pursuant to
section 2(11)8 of the 1933 Act and that the standard of culpability
of an "aider and abettor" 9 is actual knowledge of the illegal
scheme and an intent to further the scheme.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, find-
ing the existence of a highly material factual conflict, held that
1. 489 F. 2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
5. Nine of the defendants consented to a permanent injunction. Spectrum, Ltd., was
enjoined by summary judgment. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,318 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
6. See note 14 infra.
7. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,631, at 92,868.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970).
9. See note 38 infra.
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the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual
conflict'by oral testimony was reversible error. 0 It consequently
reversed and remanded the case to the district court with the
admonition that the preliminary injunctive hearing be consoli-
dated with the trial on the merits."
In 1969 the officers of Westward Corp. and Spectrum, Ltd.,
devised a plan involving the merger of their two companies for the
purpose of distributing unregistered Spectrum securities to be
subsequently sold to the public. This plan consisted of a two-step
procedure to avoid the registration requirements of section 5(c)' 2
of the 1933 Act. First, the Spectrum securities issued to the West-
ward shareholders would be exempt from the registration require-
ment of section 5 pursuant to Commission rule 133,' 3 which pro-
vided that the exchange of shares in a merger would not be con-
sidered a "sale"." Second, under section 4(1) of the 1933 Act,'"
the recipients of the Spectrum shares, provided none were
deemed to be "an issuer, underwriter or dealer,"'" could then
resell the shares without filing a registration statement.
Louis Marder, the controlling shareholder and chief execu-
tive officer of Westward, did not qualify for the registration ex-
emption since rule 133 classifies the controlling stockholder of the
disappearing corporation as an "underwriter".' Consequently,
prior to the merger, he transferred nominal ownership of many of
his shares to various friends.
On November 10, the day of the merger, Spectrum's general
counsel, Morton Berger, addressed an opinion letter, based on
representations made by Marder and Spectrum's president, to
the transfer agent; this letter conveyed Berger's opinion that the
merger complied with rule 133. Berger included in the letter a list
of recipients (among whom was Marder) of the Spectrum stock
who were considered "underwriters" and who should be issued
10. See notes 30-37 infra.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).
12. Section 5(c) of the 1933 Act [15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1970)] makes it "unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly, .. .to sell .. .any security, unless a registration
statement has been filed ....
13. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1973). Rule 133 was rescinded as of January 1, 1973. 37 FED.
REG. 236.36 (1972).
.14. The 1933 Act is not applicable unless there is a sale or an offer to sell. See
generally Note, The SEC's No-Sale Rule and Exchange of Securities Pursuant to Volun-
tary Reorganization, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1237 (1954). Actually, the rule 133 exemption was
not applicable in this case because the proposed merger was not submitted to a share-
holder vote and because the merger agreement was predicated on an illicit scheme.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970).
16. Id.
17. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(c) (1973).
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restricted stock. On November 25, Berger addressed a second
letter (not in the form of an opinion letter) to Spectrum's presi-
dent listing those persons who had received unrestricted shares.
Following the merger, Marder delivered for sale 125,000
shares of unrestricted Spectrum stock, nominally belonging to
Marder's friends John and William Doyen, to Michael Gardner,
a registered broker-dealer. Gardner refused to sell these shares
without an opinion letter stating that they were exempt from
registration. Berger, when contacted, refused to write such a let-
ter for a stockholder. Gardner then contacted Schiffman.
According to Schiffman, he visited Gardner's office twice. On
the second visit, he contended, one of Gardner's clients, James
Morse, asked him if he would help a friend, a Mr. Doyen. He
agreed. Morse telephoned Doyen; Schiffman took the phone, and
Doyen requested that Schiffman write an opinion letter confirm-
ing the unrestricted nature of the Spectrum securities. After
being shown Berger's two letters, he agreed. He subsequently
conferred with Berger and wrote the requested opinion letter,
which was addressed to Doyen but delivered to Gardner's office.
Four days later he addressed a second letter to Doyen, also deliv-
ered to Gardner's office, stating that the prior letter was not to
be used for the sale of unregistered Spectrum stock.
Gardner's version of what occurred differs sharply from that
of Schiffman's. Gardner stated that Marder himself was present
at the meeting and that it was Marder who asked Schiffman to
prepare an opinion letter for Spectrum securities that were going
to be sold by Marder. Gardner did not recall any telephone con-
versation with Doyen.
There is also a dispute about what transpired at a subse-
quent meeting between Berger and Schiffman. Berger claimed to
have warned Schiffman that he suspected that the stock was
going to be traded by a control person. Schiffman denied that this
warning was given.
In any case it is undisputed that Gardner sold 50,000 shares
of the stock after Schiffman had agreed to write, but before he
had actually written, the opinion letter. The SEC also alleged
that Gardner used the opinion letter to assure a Canadian buyer
that the unregistered shares could be traded without registration.
This allegation, however, was unsupported by independent evi-
dence.
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of
preliminary injunctive relief for the latter's failure to hold an
evidentiary hearing. Since an injunction is an extraordinary rem-
edy and the reversal of a trial judge's denial of a preliminary
19741
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injunction is rare,'" it might be helpful to examine this portion of
the decision in some detail.
Injunctions, both preliminary and permanent, are specifi-
cally authorized by section 20(b)'9 of the 1933 Act and section
21(e)2 of the 1934 Act; both types are widely used by the SEC in
its enforcement functions. 2 Because they are "statutory" as op-
posed to "equitable" in nature, it is not necessary to show a threat
of imminent or irreparable harm. 22 Courts have reasoned that,
since a statute forbids the conduct sought to be enjoined, the
legislature has already determined that the prohibited act pres-
ents a serious danger. 23 The criteria employed in SEC injunctive
actions is that the SEC must show that a violation has occurred
or is about to occur and that the defendant has a "propensity for
future violations" .2 Mere cessation of the violation prior to the
court hearing is not considered conclusive proof of a lack of "pro-
pensity for future violations".25 The court may consider past vio-
lations as well as the circumstances of the present violation in
determining such propensity. 2
A preliminary injunction is considered interlocutory relief in
an SEC action for a permanent injunction.27 To obtain a prelimi-
nary injunction the SEC must make a "clear showing '28 of proba-
ble success in a trial on the merits, i.e., a prima facie showing that
the defendant has violated, or is about to violate, the law and that
he has the propensity to violate it again. 29
Since a judge's decision to grant or deny an injunction is
discretionary, it is seldom reversed except for abuse of discre-
tion.3a The Second Circuit applies the "clearly erroneous" stan-
18. See 3 & 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION at 1975 and 4108 (2d ed. 1961);
Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994 (1965); P.L.I., ENFORCEMENT
AND LITIGATION UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS (B4-3539, No. 116, 1973) at 257 [hereinafter
cited as P.L.I.].
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970).
21. There are approximately 100 SEC injunction suits instituted each year. See 36
SEC ANNUAL REPORT 99 (1970).
22. See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REV. 994, 1059 (1965).
23. Id.
24. 489 F.2d at 540. There is some debate about whether the latter criterion should
be phrased, "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated."
For a discussion of both phrases see Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480
F.2d 341, 384-85 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
25. SEC v. Griffin, 296 F. Supp. 883 (D. Miss. 1968).
26. SEC v. Northeastern Financial Corp., 268 F. Supp. 412 (D.N.J. 1967); SEC v.
Broadwall Sec., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
27. P.L.I., supra note 18, at 262.
28. Dopp v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 461 F.2d 873, 878 (2d Cir. 1972).
29. P.L.I., supra note 18, at 262.
30. Meccane, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, New York, 253 U.S. 136 (1920).
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dard of review in deciding whether the trial court has abused that
discretion." Only if no reasonable basis for the decision is found
will it be reversed.32
There is one exception to the above rule. In Dopp v.
Franklin, 3 the Second Circuit emphasized that the "clearly erro-
neous" standard does not apply when no evidentiary hearing is
held. When a dispute is resolved through the use of written affida-
vits, no deference need be given to the district court's findings
since the court of appeals is just as able to interpret the written
evidence as the trial court.34
In the instant case, the Second Circuit disagreed with all
three of the lower court's conclusions. Concerning the major con-
clusion, since no evidentiary hearing was held, the Second Circuit
found a material factual conflict 3 l relating to whether or not
Schiffman actually committed a securities violation as an aider
and abettor of the illegal distribution scheme. It, accordingly,
reversed and remanded for a resolution of that conflict by oral
testimony. 3 Further, the Second Circuit was not content with
reversing and remanding for an evidentiary hearing. It also took
issue37 with the district court's requirement of knowledge of the
illegal scheme plus an intent to further that scheme as the
standard of culpability for determining status as an aider and
abettor.3 It classified that standard "to be a sharp and unjusti-
31. SEC v. Bangor Punta, 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd sub nom., Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 910 (1973).
32. Id.
33. 461 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1972).
34. Id.
35. See text accompanying notes 17 and 18 supra.
36. Additionally, the district court also found that Schiffman had no propensity to
commit future violations and that there was no evidence of a "sale" using his opinion
letter. A question of the relationship between the various conclusions of the district court
arises. How would a resolution of the factual conflict described above disturb these latter
two findings? Concerning the lack of propensity there are two explanations. First, the
Second Circuit, since there was no evidentiary hearing below, may have conducted a de
novo review [see Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1071
(1965)] of the written testimony and found such a propensity. Second, and more probably,
the Second Circuit may have believed that the establishment of a violation, about which
the court of appeals found a material dispute, would be a material fact to consider in
determining whether such a propensity existed [see cases cited at note 26 supra and
accompanying text]. Concerning the lack of evidence of a sale, the Second Circuit stated
that the SEC should have the opportunity at the hearing to offer proof of the alleged sale.
37. 489 F.2d at 541-43.
38. For a general discussion of "aider and abettor" in securities laws see 2 A.
BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 8.5(515) (1971); Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Se-
curities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto,
Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 620-38 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Ruder]. Professor Ruder, using a criminal law analogy, advocates the standard
employed by the district court in the instant case.
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fled departure from the negligence standard which [this court
has] repeatedly held to be sufficient in the context of enforce-
ment proceedings seeking equitable and prophylactic relief." 9
Although this negligence standard has been frequently ap-
plied in SEC injunctive actions,40 it appears that its application
to aiders and abettors, although dictum, is 4n extension of exist-
ing law." Nevertheless, the court's extension is justified, at least
in the limited area of lawyers in an opinion writing role, in light
of the purposes of the securities laws, the particular role that
lawyers play in furthering those purposes, and the importance of
the opinion letter in the securities area.
Although the use of opinion letters permeates the business
and securities areas, 2 they receive sparse treatment in the securi-
ties laws. Schedule B of the 1933 Act requires an opinion of the
issuer's counsel of the "legality of the issue"43 to be included with
form S-1 when an issuer files a registration statement." Often a
lawyer is asked to render an opinion regarding pending litigation,
claims, or other liabilities (direct or contingent) which might af-
fect the company. These may or may not be filed with the SEC
or included in the annual report. 5 An underwriting agreement
usually requires that an opinion letter from the issuer's counsel
concerning the compliance with securities laws be submitted to
39. 489 F.2d at 541. The cases cited by the court adopt the negligence standard but
do not concern aiders and abettors: SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082,
1096 (2d Cir. 1972), Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, Kline v. SEC,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). Cf. Lanza v. Drexel, 479 F.2d 1277, 1304 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
40. The court specifically limits the use of the negligence standard to SEC
injunctive actions:
We. . .emphasiz[e]. . . that the standard . . . for the author of an opinion letter
in an action for injunctive relief only should not be construed to apply to more
peripheral participants in an illicit scheme or . .. to criminal prosecutions or
private suits for damages.
489 F.2d at 542.
41. It is difficult to determine the precise standards for aider and abettor status in
SEC injunctive actions for several reasons: one, aider and abettor status is employed
principally in SEC administrative actions [see 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.2(e)(1) and
201.2(e)(3) (i)]; two, most SEC injunctive actions are settled by consent; and three, actual
knowledge of the aiders and abettors is frequently evident and, hence, not discussed by
the court. See Ruder, supra note 38, at 632.
42. For a discussion of opinion letters, see Freeman, Opinion Letters and
Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L.J. 371; Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Transactions-An
Attempt to Bring Some Order Out of Some Chaos, 28 Bus. LAw 915 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Fuld]. For an example of the form of an opinion letter, sep C. ISRAELS & G. DUFF,
WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIc 312-16 (1962).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa Schedule B (14) (1970).
44. See Fuld, supra note 42, at 940.
45. Id. at 941-44.
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the underwriter as a condition precedent to the closing.46 The
opinion letter in the instant case is related to the latter type.
Since unregistered stock is normally non-transferrable, the broker
desired an opinion letter (although it was not required by law) to
assure himself, as well as his would-be customers, that the stock
was exempt from the registration requirement.
An analysis of the cases and articles which discuss opinion
letters reveals three reasons for their importance: first, they can
be instruments for inflicting great pecuniary loss;"7 second, they
assist the by-passing of certain regulations (e.g., registration)
which would have required disclosure to the SEC;48 and lastly,
they are relied upon by the SEC, the financial community, and
the investing public. 9
The purposes of the securities laws have been amply publi-
cized in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.0 The Second Circuit,
after examining the legislative history of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, stated en banc that "[t]he dominant congressional
purposes underlying the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were to
promote free and open public securities markets and to protect
the investing public . . . ."5
In a recent article concerning the professional's role in
achieving those purposes, Theodore Sonde,"2 Assistant General
Counsel of the SEC, depicted the practicing attorney as occupy-
ing the "public's first line of defense in investor protection. '53
Expanding on that theme the SEC explained that the private
securities attorney had a "peculiarly strategic" role
in the investment process and in the enforcement of the body
of federal law aimed at keeping that process fair. . . . [Tihe
46. Id. at 940; 1 G. ROBINSON & K. EPPLER, SECURITIES LAw SERms: GOING PUBLIC
199 (1971).
47. See United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964) where Judge
Friendly states: "In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's
opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the
crowbar."
48. Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities
of Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 231, 267 (1973): "A
lawyer's opinion that an exemption exists is crucial, for it is the passkey used to avoid
registration with the SEC and that agency's opportunity to examine disclosure documents
before a sale is made."
49. See text accompanying notes 54 & 55 infra.
50. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
51. Id. at 858.
52. Mr. Sonde argued the Spectrum case for the SEC before the Second Circuit. 489
F.2d at 536.
53. Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securities
Laws-Some Observations. 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 2 (1973).
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task of enforcing the securities law rests in the overwhelming
measure on the bar's shoulders. These are statements of
what all who are versed in the practicalities of securities law
know to be a truism, i.e., that this Commission. . . is pecu-
liarly dependent on the probity and the diligence of the pro-
fessionals who practice before it. Very little of a securities
lawyer's work is adversary in character. Hle doesn't work in
courtrooms where the pressure of vigilant adversaries and
alert judges checks him. He works in his office where he
prepares prospectuses, proxy statements, opinions of
counsel, and other documents that we, our staff, the finan-
cial community, and the investing public must take on faith
54
Judge Kaufman echoes these views in his opinion:
We do not believe, moreover, that imposition of a negligence
standard with respect to the conduct of a secondary partici-
pant is overly strict, at least not in the context of this case.
The legal profession plays a unique and pivotal role in the
effective implementation of the securities laws. Questions of
compliance with the intricate provisions of these statutes are
ever present and the smooth functioning of the securities
markets will be seriously disturbed if the public cannot rely
on the expertise proffered by an attorney when he renders an
opinion on such matters.55
All three justifications are emphasized when the court ad-
dresses Professor Ruder's argument that imposing a negligence
standard on aiders and abettors would place an undue burden on
business activities.56 In the court's reply it states that "in the
distribution of unregistered securities, the preparation of an opin-
ion letter [by an attorney] is too essential and the reliance of the
public too high to permit due diligence to be cast aside in the
name of convenience." 57
Although this writer has been unable to find any other cases
involving lawyers qua lawyers as secondary participants, there
are two other cases involving lawyers that are instructive. The
first, Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,"5 involves a lawyer-
54. In re Emanuel Fields, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973)(em-
phasis added)(holding that Emanuel Fields, a lawyer, was permanently disqualified from
practicing before the SEC), also reported in [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 79,407, at 83,172.
55. 489 F.2d at 541, 542 (emphasis added).
56. Ruder, supra note 38, at 632-33.
57. 489 F.2d at 542.
58. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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director who signed a false and misleading registration statement
filed with the SEC in violation of section 11 of the 1933 Act.59
Although clearly distinguishable from Spectrum (and not cited
by the Spectrum court) in that BarChris involved a private action
for damages under a different section of the 1933 Act, it is inter-
esting to note that the BarChris court held the lawyer-director to
a higher standard of diligence than other directors. Despite find-
ing that he honestly believed the statement and that he had been
misled by the officers of the company, the court held that he
failed to make a reasonable investigation.0
In SEC v. Frank,6 involving a lawyer who was allegedly neg-
ligent in drafting an offering circular, the Second Circuit reversed
the lower court's grant of a preliminary injunction because the
lower court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing. Although, seem-
ingly similar to Spectrum, this case is distinguishable in that the
lawyer was charged as a primary participant and that he was not
charged with a violation of the registration provisions. Judge
Friendly, in dictum, did state, however, that
[a] lawyer has no privilege to assist in circulating a
statement with regard to securities which he knows to be
false simply because his client has furnished it him ...
[A] lawyer, no more than others, can [not] escape liability
for fraud by closing his eyes to what he saw and could readily
understand.2
The SEC, rather than risk denial of a permanent injunction,
accepted "undertakings" from Frank and dismissed the case be-
fore trial on the merits. 3
To these may be added the much publicized National Stu-
dent Marketing Corp. (NSMC) complaint. 4 NSMC is quite simi-
lar to Spectrum in that lawyers, together with their firms,65 are
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
60. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. at 692.
61. 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
62. Id. at 489.
63. SEC Litigation Release No. 3957 (Mar. 28, 1968).
64. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civil No. 225-72 (D.D.C., filed Feb.
3, 1972); complaint also reported in [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,360, at 91,913. See Green, Irate Attorneys-A Bid to Hold Lawyers Accountable to
Public Stuns and Angers Firms, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1972, at 1, col. 1; Koch, Attorney's
Liability, The Securities Bar and the Impact of National Student Marketing Corp., 14
WM. & MARY L. REV. 883 (1973); Note, The Attorney's Duty, 46 TEMP. L. Q. 153 (1972);
Note, Securities Regulation-Attorneys' Liability-Advising, Abetting, and the SEC's
National Student Marketing Offensive, 50 TEx. L. REv. 1265 (1972). See also 17 ST. Louis
U.L. REV. 380 (1973).




charged with preparing false and misleading opinion letters con-
cerning a merger agreement in violation of the antifraud provi-
sions of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Although they have been
charged as aiders and abettors, it appears that they had actual
knowledge of the fraudulent scheme and that the negligence stan-
dard is not an issue. In addition, the lawyers are charged with
failing to disclose the misrepresentations to the SEC.
Although the above cases are distinguishable from
Spectrum, there is discernible a strand of commonalty concerning
the lawyer's role in protecting the public's interest. In BarChris
there is an affirmative duty of the lawyer to conduct a reasonable
investigation before interposing his expertise between the repre-
sentations of his client and the public. In Frank, the Second
Circuit, albeit in dictum, echoed this idea and stressed that a
lawyer is not necessarily protected by taking his client's asser-
tions at face value. Using the same reasoning in Spectrum it
would appear that Schiffman could not merely accept the
statement from his client or another attorney" that the unregis-
tered stock qualified for an exemption, but would have to take
some affirmative action to insure that the laws were followed.
The above cases, together with Spectrum, tend to indicate
that an attorney-at least the securities attorney-has a broader
duty to the public than has generally been realized. One commen-
tator, after conducting an informal survey concerning lawyers'
written opinions, summarized his results by stating "that law-
yers, as a group, do not as a rule expect to be held strictly ac-
countable for their written advice." 7 He concluded his article
with a warning which could be considered a portent of the
Spectrum case. "For those who feel that the whole idea of an
attorney being held responsible for less-than-adequate advice or
complete failure of advice is unworthy of serious concern, the
time is fast approaching when these heads had better come out
of the sand! '6 8
It is no overstatement to say that the time referred to has
come. The aggressive attitude to enforce this public duty demon-
-strated by the SEC in the Spectrum and National Student Mar-
keting Corp. cases has struck a responsive chord in the Second
Circuit. The attorney in the securities field must acknowledge his
66. But cf. Beardsley v. Ernst, 47 Ohio App. 241, 191 N.E. 808 (1934), in which an
accountant was insulated from liability because he relied on another accountant's audit
and so stated in his certificate. Schiffman claims to have relied on Berger's opinion.
67. Corso, Opinions of Counsel: Responsibilities and Liabilities, 17 CLEVE-MAR. L.
REV. 375 (1968).
68. Id. at 387.
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obligation to an increasingly skeptical public. Moreover, the Bar
must assume the same self-policing role that the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants has undertaken with respect
to its members. "
69. For further discusion of this topic, see generally Attorney Responsibility and
Potential Liability Under the Maryland Securities Act, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 23,628 [Md.
Securities Act Release No. 16 (Mar. 9, 1974)]; Schulman, Responsibilities of the Attorney
in EMERGING FEDERAL SECURmES LAW: POTENTIAL LIABILITY (V. Norbin ed. 1969); Freeman,
Liability of Counsel for Issuer, 24 Bus. LAW. 635 (1969); Goldberg, Policing Responsibili-
ties of the Securities Bar: The A ttorney-Client Relationship and the Code of Professional
Responsibility- Considerations for Expertizing Securities Attorneys, 19 N.Y.L.F. 221
(1973); Henkel, Liability of Counsel for Underwriter, 24 Bus. LAW 641 (1969); Karmel,
Attorneys' Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAW. 1153 (1972); Lathrop & Rinehart,
Legal Malpractice and Rule lOb-5 Liability: Pitfalls for the Occasional Securities
Practitioner, 5 LooLA L. REv.-L.A. 449 (1972); Mann, Rule l0b-5: Evolution of a Contin-
uum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1206 (1970); Comment, The Effect of SEC Injunctions in Subsequent Private Dam-
age Actions-Rachal v. Hill, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1329 (1971); Note, Accountants'Liabilities
for False and Misleading Financial Statements, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1437 (1967); Comment,
SEC Disciplinary Rules and the Federal Securities Laws: The Regulation, Role and Res-
ponsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DUKE L. J. 969; Note, Public Accountants and Attor-
neys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW 588 (1972).
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